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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Increasing globalisation and pressures to reduce costs and improve efficiencies 
have increased food supply chain complexity. This has given rise to conditions that increase 
food firm vulnerability to both food fraud (for economic gain) and attack (for psychological 
or ideological reasons), (van Ruth, et al. 2017; Spink et al., 2017). Thus it is timely to 
review food defence initiatives across a number of countries to determine the feasibility of 
incorporating specific food defence measures in supply chain risk management systems.   
Design/methodology/approach: Due the emergent nature of the challenges associated with 
food defence grey as well as academic literature were reviewed. Based on an initial scan 
of the literature (academic, grey and open) specific search terms and keywords, key 
authors, key institutions (e.g. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), FDA, WHO) and key 
publications were identified. Terminology used was also scanned across social media 
platforms (in particular Twitter).  This informed the key words used in a systematic review 
of literature using the following databases Google Scholar, Science Direct, Web of Science, 
EBSCO (business complete) and Scopus and the searches were extended to non-peer-
reviewed publications. The  included publications by companies involved 
in food safety training, industry magazines, white papers, publications of standards groups 
such as GFSI, SSAFE, GMA and the BRC, regulatory authorities and online blogs and 
websites.   
Findings: The development of food supply chain defence initiatives is at an early stage and 
represents an area of on-going activity and trial.  A review of such initiatives identifies key 
strategies (deterrence; detection; control and countermeasures), increased and ongoing 
effort to develop rapid tests, and vulnerability assessment tools developed within a 
regulatory framework. This review points to the need for ongoing development of food 
supply chain actor capacity to use vulnerability tools and associated databases and to 
embed fraud/threat defences into their management processes.  
Value: A number of factors combine to increase the challenges posed by food fraud and 
attack in this decade.  This study aims to contribute to emerging research by exploring the 
context, considering key characteristics of food fraud/attack and evaluating responses by 
companies and regulatory authorities, in the context of resilient supply chains.  As such it 
may be of interest to researchers, policy makers and food supply chain actors. 
Research limitations/implications: This paper is limited to the review stage of a larger 
research project.   
Practical implications: In addition to providing an evidence base to underpin the 
development of a more food resilient food supply chains, this study aims to raise awareness 
and knowledge about the challenges posed by fraud/attack. 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasing globalisation and pressures to reduce costs and improve efficiencies have 
increased food supply chain complexity. This has given rise to conditions that increase food 
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firm vulnerability to adulteration of products through both fraud (for economic gain) and 
threat (for psychological or ideological reasons), (Moyer et al., 2017; van Ruth et al., 
2017). Adulteration is the deliberate addition of, or alteration to, an ingredient in a food 
product for malicious reasons (Moyer et al., 2017). Thus, the concept of adulteration 
st, 
contamination  which is the focus of Food Safety and Food Quality - is accidental and may 
not involve deliberate actions by any human or organisational actor in the production 
network or chain. Researchers, policy makers and supply chain stakeholders have 
distinguished between two categories of motivations for adulteration (GFSI, 2014); 
economically-motivated adulteration; and ideologically-motivated adulteration. Responses 
to prevent, deter, detect, or mitigate the effects of these two categories of motivation have 
 These 
concepts extend beyond Food Safety and Food Quality, which are concerned with 
unintentional actions that endanger or contaminate the food supply, because food fraud 
and food threat are the result of intentional action on the part of malevolent or criminal 
actors (see Figure 1). 
 
Based on a systematic review of 
literature in the field, this paper aims 
to establish conditions contributing to 
the emergence of these challenges, 
current responses to these threats 
and the underlying assumptions, 
principles and processes.  The paper 
is structured as follows: (i) the next 
section defines and describes both 
food fraud and food defence, (ii) this 
is followed by a methodology section 
that outlines the systematic literature 
approach adopted, (iii) the findings of 
this review are reported in the 
following section and (iv) the paper 
concludes with a discussion of these 
findings and puts forward 
suggestions for future work. 
  
DEFINITIONS  Food Fraud and Food Defence 
Food Fraud encompasses a wide variety of intentional actions, motivated in one way or 
another by the potential for economic gain, or  less frequently perhaps - to avoid economic 
loss. Thus, most cases of food fraud involve the substitution of a relatively expensive 
ingredient with a less expensive one at some point in the supply chain, and consequent 
monetary gain for that intermediary supplier. In some other cases an ingredient that was 
temporarily unavailable or in short stock may be substituted because the processor wished 
to satisfy a contract or to maintain an established supply relationship. We may also 
(Manning, 2016; Manning and Soon, 2016), although not all cases can be clearly 
categorised as one or the other. Intrinsic frauds involve the material substitution of an 
ingredient  olive or myrtle leaves (Black et 
al., 2016)
of an ingredient, for example whether it is of organically-certified origin (Megget, 2018), 
has PGI/PDO certification (Marks and Paravicini, 2017); or is produced in conformance with 
special rules and conditions, such as being halal (McElwee et al., 2017). Many extrinsic 
frauds are also classified as being cases of mislabelling  this was the most frequently 
reported classification in the EU Food and Feed Alerts (RASFF) database in 2017. EMA 
(Economically Motivated Adulteration) has emerged as a term to cover not just deliberate 
adulteration but also misrepresentation of foods for economic gain and thus covers a range 
of fraud activities. 
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Food Threats and the r ce1 - are cases of 
adulteration that are motivated by ideological, political, or personal factors. These range 
from large-scale adulteration for ideological/political reasons  -
-  to those arising from much more local reasons of personal 
animus or enmity, most typically actions by a disgruntled employee aimed at damaging 
the economic or reputational position of their employer. While much attention and 
research, especially in the USA, has focussed on the first type of food threat (Mitenius et 
al., 2014), documented incidents of that kind have been extremely rare, with the most 
prominent being the Oregon salad-bar attacks in 1984 which were motivated by political 
conflicts at the local-government level (Török et al., 1997). By contrast, the second type, 
arising from personal grievances, have been quite common and widely reported across 
different industry sectors and geographic regions (Mitenius et al., 2014). 
METHODOLOGY  Systematic Literature Review 
For this review we followed the general approach of Briner and Denyer (2012). However, 
we retained the general topics of Food Fraud and Food Threats, rather than refining them 
to a specific research question, as those authors advocate. The reasoning for that decision 
was that these topics are currently under-researched and consequently knowledge is too 
unstructured for specification of questions to be feasible or productive. In addition, we 
wanted to review a wide range of research questions related to these topics covering 
descriptive accounts of incidents, theories on motivations and strategies, and practices 
(both extant and proposed) for managing the risks resulting from food fraud and threats. 
With that one exception we followed the steps specified in Briner and  as 
illustrated in Figure 1Error! Reference source not found.. 
The set of search terms used are listed in Error! Reference source not found.. These 
terms were chosen based on initial scanning of the literature, and also because they were 
Web of Science, Scopus, EBSCO2, and AgEconSearch. The results of these searches are 
shown also in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Initial selection screened for relevance, e.g. excluding articles on the details or refinement 
of analytical techniques. Secondary selection involved first merging references and 
removing duplicates. The next step involved retaining only those articles with non-zero 
citation counts, based on Google Scholar data. Finally, the uncited articles were reviewed 
for quality and those which the authors judged to be authoritative (e.g. published by a 
competent authority or noted author), topical, or otherwise novel were retained. 
 
 
Figure 1 Search & Selection Process 
 
                                           
1 We use the UK spelling, although most of the literature on Food Defence/Defense 
originates in the USA. 
2 For EBSCO we choose to search the following sub-collections: Academic Search Complete 
Business Abstracts, Business Source Complete, eBook Collection, Readers' Guide, Regional 
Business News, Social Sciences Full Text, SocIndex, UK & Ireland Reference Centre. 
1. Search terms & databases; citation chaining; "organic" search
2. Initial Selection - based on titles and abstracts
3. Secondary Selection - based on citations & relevance (& 
merged duplicates)
4. Tertiary Selection - based on abstracts
5. Close reading of full papers
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Subsequent to selection a number of practices advocated by Briner and Denyer were used 
to expand the set of resources and to increase its comprehensiveness. These included 
ting 
articles; and working backwards from the references of the most-cited articles. Explicit 
searches were also made for additional items, e.g. in the forms of presentations and reports 
by the most-cited authors, and in the archives for those journals with the most articles in 
was deemed important (Adams et al., 2017). Additional articles were collected through 
s recommended by experts and 
colleagues, ones publicised on social media (Twitter) by a list of authorities that had been 
compiled, and finally by searching the web-sites of organisations known to be actively 
working on the topic, such as GFSI, BRC and SSAFE. At the end of this stage 509 items 
were retained, categorised as follows: 304 cited articles; 118 uncited but relevant; 87 
 
 
Table 1 Search terms & statistics 
Search Terms Science 
Direct 




food AND fraud 8577 6442 8542 4729 18 
"food fraud" 347 594 179 431 0 
"food Defence" 173 352 79 140 8 
"food defence" 42 
 
15 11 1 
"food threat" 19 27 4 22 0 
"economically motivated adulteration" 117 377 64 52 0 
"supply chain resilience" AND food 45 208 8 8 0 
"supply chain vulnerability" AND food 41 177 5 8 0 
"vulnerability resolution initiative" 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 784 1735 354 672 9 
 
Tertiary selection involved review of the full metadata for the 509 articles and reading of 
the associated abstracts. In this stage selection was again based on relevance (e.g. 
excluding consumer studies, and papers on methods for predictive modelling), timeliness 
(noted but deleted historic/archival articles), appropriateness (e.g. supply chain risk 
management/resilience), and quality (e.g. short commentaries). In addition, the process 
of developing themes to summarise this body of research knowledge was begun at this 
stage. At the end of tertiary selection 180 articles were retained, which were then divided 
out among the research team for close reading and for analysis using the initially developed 
set of themes. The output of the final (close-reading) stage was, (i) a set of themes and 
(ii) thematic assignment of the corpus of articles. 
FINDINGS 
Motivation  rational behaviour (for a criminal mind) 
From a motivational perspective fraud/threat differs fundamentally from food safety and 
quality. Most authorities on food fraud/threats, e.g. Spink et al. (2013, 2016, 2017) in 
relation to fraud and the WHO (2002) on defence, have argued that these activities differ 
markedly from the type of issues that are familiar to producers in relation to Food Safety. 
They argue that in food safety one seeks to control frequently occurring events, that arise 
from natural sources such as contamination or processing errors, and therefore the focus 
of controls is in identifying the most important (or critical) risks, and then initiating 
responses that reduce the likelihood and consequences of those risks. HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points) is the primary example of such an approach. Risks and 
likelihoods of this kind are identifiable, enumerable, and quantifiable because, they are 
internal to the processing unit and, being frequently occurring, are amenable to data 
collection on their context, causes and overall likelihood. By contrast, in the case of 
fraud/threat vulnerabilities may have never occurred before, may never occur again, or 
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may be a potential opportunity that never leads to an actual event. It is such vulnerabilities 
(Spink et 
al., 2017:216)  that matter when developing countermeasures against fraud or threats, 
and these vulnerabilities can be assessed only qualitatively in terms of likelihood and 
(Spink et al., 2017:216).  Some 
aspects of a vulnerability assessment may of course be aided by quantitative data sources 
(e.g. commodity prices movements) and it is suggested that these are incorporated in 
response strategies (FSA and NSF, 2015). 
Spink et al. (2017:216) further argued that the management of fraud (and, by extension, 
countermeasures and control systems from 
 (from ISO 
standards) 
 (Spink et al., 2017:217). 
He defines 
efore, the argument made in the research on Food Fraud 
and Food Threats is that countermeasures against these risks should be based on 
prevention of the causes of such events, i.e. by assessing vulnerabilities; whereas 
countermeasures in the field of Food Safety are based on mitigating the consequences of 
risks to safety of the product, by assessing risks especially at critical points in the 
production process (Spink et al., 2017:217). 
Response  think like a criminal 
Given this motivation, responses focus attention on the conditions that lead to 
fraud/threats, with assessment tools designed to address motivations and opportunities to 
commit such offenses and responses are designed to detect and respond to them (Manning 
and Soon, 2016; van Ruth et al., 2017). Thus, in very broad terms, these responses can 
be described as strategies based on: 
Deterrence; 
Detection; 
Control and Countermeasures. 
These strategies seek to shift the balance from low risk of detection and good opportunity 
to profit illegally to high risk of detection and strongly negative consequences of such for 
the perpetrator. The food fraudster  attention is focused on market signals such as price-
spikes or increasing demand for a commodity and the potential opportunity to act which is 
dependent on issues such as complexity of supply chain or availability of technology and 
knowledge to adulterate, and thus they seek to identify areas where the chances of 
detection and/or consequences if detected are low.  Thus strategies to combat this seek to 
enhance horizon scanning to detect candidate products/ingredients and improve visibility 
and information sharing.  Similarly, terrorists are attracted to opportunities to act where 
they have impact.  On the other hand, they may be less concerned with detection after the 
event, but are concerned about surveillance while planning. Thus, strategies to respond 
are also informed by horizon scanning, visibility and information flow.   
Vulnerability  identifying weak points 
Although other states and regions are developing law in relation to fraud and threat (Mol, 
2014; Walker, 2017; Zhang and Xue, 2016), almost all of the extant research is concerned 
with the US or the EU. In the US, the overarching piece of law concerning fraud and threat 
is the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), signed into law in 2011. This is considered 
to be the most significant reform of Food law in the US since 1938 (Layton, 2009). In 
preventing intentional 
adulteration from acts intended to cause wide-scale harm to public health, including acts 
it now incorporates requirements for similar preventive strategies against economically-
motivated adulteration (food fraud). Specifically, it requires vulnerability assessments 
against food fraud: events that could lead 
(Spink and Moyer, 2017:58). 
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In the EU the central law is Regulation (EU) 2017/625, which updates the earlier Regulation 
(EC) 178/2002. The 2002 regulation established the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) and placed the HACCP process at the centre of food safety practice. The 2017 
regulation, developed in the wake of the horse meat fraud (Elliott, 2014) added provisions 
-
required the relevant national authori
-
national information sharing, which have subsequently been implemented through 
mechanisms such as RASFF and European Food Fraud Network (EFFN). 
In response to this a range of industry standards have been developed or adapted (given 
the limitations of established food quality assurance process (e.g. HACCP) to equip food 
supply chain actors to respond to these challenges). Such standards specify processes and 
tests that food business operators and auditors can use in practice to identify and resolve 
fraud- or threat-related - vulnerabilities in their production systems. Over the past two 
decades private organisations (e.g. BRC, SQF) have developed internationally accepted 
quality assurance standards. These standards, which usually seek accreditation from 
established global bodies (e.g. ISO, GFSI), require certified food supply chain actors to 
employ various processes and methods which in turn are audited.  In recent years the 
processes required (e.g. HACCP) have been adapted to include measures that respond to 
food fraud and treats.  While these measures in turn differ somewhat they all include a 
vulnerability assessment tool that assesses level of opportunity and motivation and 
adequacy of control measures. These tools are largely self-assessment with links to 
databases (e.g. commodity prices, fraud/threat incidents such as USP and RASFF) to 
support horizon scanning.  Figure 2 illustrates the role and relationship between 
accreditation and certification within the overall international and national legal context. 
In response of the proliferation of schemes at the Certification level in relation to food 
safety, and the consequent burden of regulation and auditing on businesses (Kleboth et 
al., 2016), efforts were initiated by industry actors to create more loosely-specified and 
promoted by the Certification bodies. Most prominent among these are the Global Food 
Safety Initiative (GFSI), established in 2000, under the auspices of the Consumer Goods 
Forum (CGF, then CIES), a group comprising of major international food manufacturers 
and retailers. 
 der Meulen, 
2011:116). A second accreditation body is the International Standard Organisation (ISO), 
which developed a food safety standard ISO 22000, supported by the multi-national food 
(van der Meulen, 2011:132). However, the retailers 
were slow to accept and adopt ISO 22000, and so a new organisation was established, the 
Foundation for Food Safety Certification (FSSC) and this organisation developed a broader 
standard, FSSC 220003, issued first in 2009. FSSC 22000 is among the standards accepted 
by GFSI. Thus GFSI has emerged as the dominant accreditation body. These standards, 
an Ruth et al., 2017:70) with a vulnerability 
assessment tool fundamental to their operation.  
 
                                           
3 FSSC 22000 integrated ISO 22000, and additional module that was called PAS 220, issued 
first in 2008. 
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Figure 2 Accreditation and Certification Bodies  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Some key themes arise from this review: susceptibility, role of law and standards, and 
information flow. Food system susceptibility arises due to weakness/gaps that are 
identified and exploited by perpetrators intent on fraud/threat rather than vulnerability 
that we typically consider in the field of supply chain management, i.e. risk level and 
capability to respond. Hence response to fraud/threat focusses on weakness or gaps within 
the system, with an emphasis on prevention, rather than mitigation. The role of information 
flow is crucial to response strategies with a fundamental need for collaboration among food 
system stakeholders at various levels. Database development has been facilitated by both 
public agencies (e.g. EFFN in EU) and commercial concerns such as USP, based in the US, 
and FERA (horizon scanning) in the UK. An increased and ongoing effort to develop rapid 
testing methods (Ellis et al., 2015) has greatly enhanced surveillance of fraud/threat.  This 
review points to the need for ongoing development of food supply chain actor capacity to 
use databases and embed fraud/threat defences into their management processes.  
 
As evident from above, quality control and assurance processes fall short when dealing 
with fraud/threats, as suppliers intentionally set out to act opportunistically in their own 
self-interest and to the detriment of the buyer. For example, imposition of contractual 
penalties or reputational loss are not adequate penalties to deter those of a criminal or 
terrorist mind-set, rather legal frameworks can play a role.  Indeed, deterrence as a 
strategy to control fraud and threat relies primarily on the State, by relying on it for 
(A. T. Kearney and GMA, 2010:19). Furthermore, the 
public nature of such prosecutions creates a less attractive environment for perpetrators, 
as does a visible response by supplier chain actors through use of risk assessment tools 
usually linked to industry level standards and associated processes. Activity to date also 
points to a role for  (i.e. industry imposed standards), since certification is a 
requirement for doing business in many contracts the non-conformant business is 
effectively excluded from such business relationships and may be forced to accept lower 
prices or more disadvantageous conditions. A non-conformant business consequently is 
positioned outside of, and excluded from doing business with, the whole group of 




opportunistically. Thus further research that classifies and measures the impact of different 




Standard: e.g. BRC, SQF
Implementation
Process: e.g. TACCP, VACCP 






International and National 
Food Law
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multi-national food processors or retail chains that are the sponsors or members of the 
GMA (Grocery Manufacturers Association) or GFSI, can, by specifying conformance to their 
standards (which now include food fraud/threat defences), exert an influence that supports 
deterrence throughout the food supply chain.  
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